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Ghana’s public debt has been rising for the entire post-independence era. The only time 
Ghana’s public debt fell was when there were international interventions in the form of debt 
relief such as the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) in the 1990s. Despite the continues 
rise in public debt, economic growth has been moderate. In fact, according to the IMF, although 
Ghana’s debt was at an all-time high in August 2019, Ghana was also one of the four fastest 
growing economies in Africa in October 2019. 
This study investigated whether the surging public debt levels in Ghana is a credible 
challenge to growth similar to what occurred in Latin America and European countries. The 
study used an OLS regression model, the discrete threshold regression technique, and the 
Granger causality test to analyze the relationship between Ghana’s rising debt and its economic 
growth using data from 1970 to 2018. The discrete threshold regression technique was used to 
investigate nonlinear relationships between the variables.  
The study revealed that debt granger-causes growth (unidirectional). At debt-to-GDP ratio 
below 25 percent, growth is negative (-1.348), but becomes insignificant at debt threshold 
between 25 percent and 45 percent. However, when debt is above 45 percent of GDP, growth 
is significantly positive. Between 45 and 60 percent of GDP, growth is 3.21 percent, whiles 
when debt supersedes 60 percent of GDP growth is significantly around 6 percent.  
The study recommends prudent borrowing above 45 percent of GDP by the Ghanaian 
government to invest in productive sectors of the economy whiles ramping up efforts in 
formalizing the huge informal sector to spur growth.





BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
African countries have experienced rapid increase in their public debt in recent years 
(Bernadini and Fomi, 2017).  This requires much attention and knowledge for informed policy 
decisions. These debt surges are as a result of several situations. One reason is that Governments 
often lack the required funds to finance major investments projects, finance tax cuts, or even bail 
out financially distressed banks. The Increased public expenditure due to the urgency in which 
governments must tackle these problems has led to dramatic increases in demand for leverage 
which has resulted in high levels of accumulated public debt in recent times (Ncanywa & 
Masoga, 2018; Kouretas & Vlamis, 2010).  
However, there is no consensus in the economics literature on the exact causal effect of 
debt on economic growth. For example, scholars such as Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), Shahor 
(2018), Mankiw (2014), Balassone (2011), and Barrow (1999) have found a negative 
relationship between the variables, greatly attributing the relationship to the crowding out of 
investment capital via public debt servicing.  
Others such as Reinhart and Rogoff (2010, 2011) and Anning et al. (2016) found that the 
relationship is positive between public debt levels and economic growth. Contrary to the 
aforementioned findings, several other scholars found that there is no relationship at all between 
the variables (Cohen, 1993; Panizza and Presbitero, 2013). 
More interestingly, some scholars have suggested that there is a ‘conditional relationship’ 
between the variables. For example, Yener, Stengos, and Yazgan (2017) argue that the 
macroeconomic fundamentals of a country are key in analyzing the relationship between public 
debt and economic growth. The authors explain that when the fundamentals are weak, there is no 





need for policymakers to think about any debt policy that could spur growth because there is no 
such policy. But when the economic fundamentals are strong, then it is feasible to think of 
optimal debt policies that could spur growth. Similarly, Anning et al (2016) concludes that debt 
has no negative consequences on the Ghanaian economy, but the benefits of debt can only be 
realized when borrowed funds are put into productive use rather than diverted into private 
pockets.  
 SOME DEBT CRISIS IN THE WORLD 
 The Latin American Crisis 
In the 1980s, large shocks of oil prices led to current account deficits in most Latin 
American countries, notably Argentina, Peru, Chile, Brazil, Mexico, and Nicaragua. In 
comparison, the price shocks created current account surpluses in the oil exporting countries. As 
a fundamental investment principle, US banks, encouraged by the Bush administration, served as 
intermediaries in receiving large deposits from the gainers of the shocks and lending to the Latin 
American countries (Sims & Romero, 2013). By the end of 1970, outstanding debts for Latin 
American countries to foreign financial institutions totaled US$29 billion, but this amount 
skyrocketed by five folds to US$159 billion eight years later in 1978. By 1982, Latin American 
nations were owing an estimated amount of US$327 billion.  
Following the recession of world economies in 1981, Europe and America tightened 
monetary policy. Commercial banks, in response, shortened repayment periods and charged 
higher interest rates on debts. As a result of the precautionary measures by the banks, Latin 
American countries soon found themselves with unsustainable debt burdens (Devlin and 
Ffrench-Davis, 1995).  





Shockingly, by mid-1982, the Mexican government announced its decision to default on 
its debts repayment which stood at US$80 billion. Immediately after the Mexican government’s 
announcement of debt defaults, other countries quickly followed suit in defaulting their 
outstanding debts, whiles sixteen other Latin American countries rescheduled their debt 
repayments (Sims & Romero, 2013).  
In response to the defaulting news, banks ceased lending to Latin American countries and 
the consequences became fatal. As countries suffered financial turbulence, Latin American 
countries’ last resort was borrowing, so lending cuts plunged most of them in severe recessions 
because they lacked access to investment capital to spur growth (FDIC, 1997).  
Consequentially, output per head in 1990 was nine percent lower than in 1980, inflation 
was in double digits for most countries and even three to five digits for Brazil, Argentina, 
Nicaragua, and Peru. Unemployment levels surged and investment per worker massively fell 
(Felix,1990). 
 EUROZONE DEBT CRISIS 
The Eurozone debt crisis, which was mainly triggered by the 2008/09 global financial 
crash, created a lot of macroeconomic imbalances within member countries. These imbalances 
were mainly current account deficits and rising external debt (Storm & Naastepad, 2015). 
Following the European monetary and financial integration, people got more access to credit 
inflows from other countries which boosted demand domestically during the pre-crisis period.  
Eventually, in 2008, private and public debts had reached unsustainable levels across the 
Euro area with Greece becoming the biggest victim. Fueled by the debt overhang problem, the 





Euro area eventually entered a recession in 2008. By 2014, Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Italy’s 
GDP fell by 26.3, 5.7, 6.8, and 9.6 percent respectively (Storm & Naastepad, 2015).  
Although, the debt crisis was, fueled by the monetary integration which saw the use of 
the Euro as a common currency, different policy implementations across the union led to varying 
outcomes in different countries. 
 According to Richard (2013), the Greece crisis erupted from policymakers’ goal of 
providing production-compromising social welfare and many other populist policies for citizens. 
Just like their European counterparts-in-debt, they socialized private debts by granting bailouts to 
financially distressed banks. Greek government increased its defense spending (due to the 
conflict with Turkey over Cyprus) and increased public sector employment. Coupled with 
revenue deficits, the increased spending led to budget deficits and the Greek government resorted 
to borrowing to sustain its policies, hence the genesis of the debt crisis (Dimitraki and 
Kartsaklas, 2017).  
Prior to the crisis in 2008/09, the Greek economy after its reconstruction in the 1950s, 
became the fastest growing economy within the EU-15 and the OECD countries until the 1980s 
(Dimitraki & Kartsaklas, 2017). For the same period, the Greek debt to GDP ratio was around 17 
percent in the1960s; 20 percent in the 1970s; 37 percent in the 1980s; 104 percent in the 1990s 
whilst it reached 157 percent of GDP in 2012 (IMF, 2012). As depicted in Figure 1.0 below, the 
debt ratio kept rising even after the crisis and reached about 180 percent of GDP in 2018. This 
continuous rise in debt levels compelled EU countries to grant Greece a debt relief of US$300 
billion until 2032 where they will reassess the debt situation (CNBC, 2018).  





Also, a look at Greece’s economic growth shows poor growth during the period of its 
debt crisis (which coincided with the global financial crisis in 2008/09) until 2014 when it started 
recovering, as reported by CNBC (2019).  
Figure 1.0: Greece’s Debt-GDP Ratio, GDP growth, Revenue (%GDP), and Expenditure 
(%GDP) from 1980-2018 
 
Source: IMF’s World Economic Outlook 
In 2008/09, the Portuguese economy was hit by the global financial crisis (Reis, 2013). 
Whiles massive capital inflows for both the private and public sector (in the early 2000s) led to 
rising debt levels, the Portuguese economy experienced almost no growth, productivity was 
stagnated, and unemployment was at a record high (Blanchard, 2007).  
Surprisingly, a look at the government expenditure and revenue during the pre and in-
crisis period (from 1990 to 2010) showed no significant variation – they remained constant till 
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slightly appreciated whiles expenditure fell slightly as well. This observation could be a result of 
fiscal tightening policies aimed at salvaging the economy from the crisis by authorities.  
As suggested by the literature above, the economy experienced almost no growth during 
the pre-crisis and post-crisis period, and this is depicted by the movement of the GDP per capita 
growth along zero percent or below in Figure 1.1. However, the debt-to-GDP ratio kept creeping 
upwards despite a lack of its reflection in the growth of the economy until 2011 where it began 
stabilizing due to policy interventions by European and international financial institutions 
(CNBC, 2018). 
Figure 1.1: Portugal’s government revenue, expenditure, GDP per capita growth, and debt 
[percent of GDP] for 1990-2018 
 
Source: IMF’s World Economic Outlook 
 The high levels of sovereign debts (As in Figure 1.1 and 1.0 for Portugal and Greece 
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responded by demanding for higher bond yields (Schambaugh, 2012). As a result, troubled 
eurozone countries like Portugal had fewer capital inflows from lenders during and briefly after 
the crisis and more importantly, the increased bond yields even led to increased debt-GDP ratio 
given growth (the denominator in the ratio) fell and interest rates surged. The interest rate surge 
led to limited access to capital inflows to drive investment and growth, hence the beginning of 
recessions in the euro area. 
1.3 GHANA DEBT PROBLEM AND THE HIPC INITIATIVE  
 Ghana’s debt problem has its roots in the 1960s, even before debt crisis became common 
(Harrigan & Younger, 2000). Although at a lower level, Ghana’s first debt crisis erupted in 
1980s after her outstanding debt amounted to US$577 million with a debt to GDP ratio of 30.2 
percent. As the timing of the crisis may suggest, the oil price shocks in the late 1980s, high rises 
in international cost of borrowing, as well as the recession in the Europe and Latin America 
preceded the crisis (Osei & Quartey, 2001).  
 Between the 1970s and the 1990s, total debt rose by over 300% due to borrowings for 
projects that produced little export earnings and low returns (de Bruijn & Rehbein,2011).  But 
despite incredible surges in debt levels in the early 1990s, by the end of the 1990s, debt levels 
became sustainable, falling from 56.57 per cent in 1988 to 36.95 in 1990 (Osei & Quartey, 
2001).  The sustainability of debt in 1990 was not coincidental because Ghana was benefitting 
from the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) which allowed it to get total debt relief from 
debts owed to monetary institutions such the IMF, IDA, and the World Bank (Anning et al., 
2016). This debt relief allowed the country to step up its borrowing demands to finance 





infrastructure projects and eventually debt levels rose again eight years later and declared 
unsustainable by the world bank in 1999 (de Bruijn & Rehbein,2011).  
 The increased debt levels were also partly motivated by the IMF’s Economic Recovery 
Program (ERP). The ERP sought to ensure improvements in debt repayments, restoring 
international creditworthiness, and attracting inflows of foreign capital to boost infrastructure 
and growth (Osei & Quartey, 2001). Not until the emergence of the ERP could Ghana borrow as 
much because its creditworthiness was low on the international stage.  
de Bruijn and Rehbein (2011) explained that the unsustainability of debt was down to a 
number of issues: (i) falling commodity prices, (ii) High fiscal debt, and (iii) heavy dependence 
on external flows. Since cocoa and gold were the main source of foreign exchange, downward 
price shocks in the early 1980s and 1999 led to reduced foreign exchange earnings and Ghana 
had to resort to borrowing to survive. On high fiscal deficits, the government’s continuous 
spending on unproductive sectors of the economy, coupled with the collapse of the cedi in 
1999/2000 pulled the trigger (de Bruijn & Rehbein,2011).  
As can be seen in Figure 1.1, between the 1980s and the 1990s (the period associated 
with debt crisis), economic growth was highly volatile for Ghana as growth fell mostly below the 
zero per cent line. However, after the debt relief via the HIPC initiative, growth stabilized, and 
the country is now on track as one of the fastest growing economies in the world despite the 
rising debt levels (Naidoo and Wallace, 2019). 
 





Figure 1.2: Ghana’s government revenue, expenditure, GDP per capita growth, and debt 
[percent of GDP] for 1980-2018 
 
Source: IMF’s World Economic Outlook and World Development Indicators 
After taking over a country with highly unsustainable debt levels in 2001 (refer to Figure 
1.2), President Kufour’s government argued that it could do little in terms of fighting poverty 
and boosting economic development (Osei & Quartey, 2001). As a result, Ghana requested to 
join the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative by the IMF and the World bank (IMF, 
2004). The purpose was to obtain debt relief from creditor countries such as the US, Japan, 
Britain and Germany, and to secure low interest loans to invest in productive sectors to spur her 
stagnant economic growth.  
Under the HIPC initiative, in 2002, Ghana received debt relief amounting to US$275.2 
million. In 2003, the country enjoyed debt relief of US$290.8 million and US$318.3 million as at 
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 WAS THE HIPC PROGRAM NECESSARY FOR GHANA? 
The donor countries agreed to the HIPC initiative because they intended it to be used in a 
way that will benefit the poor (Osei & Quartey, 2001). The resources made available after debt 
relief could boost economic growth by reducing domestic borrowings. This reduction in 
domestic borrowings makes available funds that firms and individuals alike can borrow to 
finance investment projects, hence, to spur economic growth. But is debt relief enough to spur 
growth or prevent further debt crisis? The evidence is clear— despite the debt relief through the 
HIPC initiative, Ghana’s debt has not stopped surging upwards (refer to Figure 1.4). Similarly, 
the surging debt levels has not stopped the economy from steadily growing along.  
Before the HIPC program, in 1998, the poverty headcount ratio at US$2 a day (PPP) was 
63 percent and 39 percent for US$1.25 a day. However, in 2009 (5 years after the HIPC 
initiative), the poverty headcount ratio for US$2 and US$1.25 a day fell from 63 percent and 39 
percent to 54 percent and 28.5 percent respectively (de Bruijn & Rehbein,2011). Infant mortality 
rate had dropped from 68 per cent to 47 percent within the same period too. At this point, it is 
fair to argue that the HIPC initiative achieved the donors’ aim of reducing poverty, but could 
Ghana have achieved that poverty milestone without the HIPC initiative?  
As Osei and Quartey (2001) argue, Ghana could not have achieved that reduction in 
poverty rate within five years without making rigorous structural adjustment in its policies. First 
of all, about 80 percent of the total workforce are in the informal sector which makes it difficult 
for government to raise enough tax revenue for development projects. The constrained tax base 
has always made it a difficult task for the government to finance its budget, thereby resorting to 





borrowing. The government could have taken measures towards formalizing the informal sector 
to broaden the tax base to increase its revenue generation potential.  
Also, Ghana depended heavily on cocoa and gold exports and the development of those 
sectors could help boost its foreign exchange earnings (Osei and Quartey, 2001). The 
establishment of factories to process the raw cocoa and gold to secondary goods for export will 
generate more foreign exchange than the raw materials export. Although taking an initiative to 
establish processing plants for those products would have required some sort of borrowing at that 
time, the future cashflows from those investments would have helped reduced the country’s 
consistent borrowing. 
In summary, Ghana benefitted from the HIPC initiative because it made available 
resources to fight against poverty and invest in other sectors of the economy such as healthcare. 
However, it did not stop the country from future borrowing as debt levels surged in the post-
HIPC period. Ghana’s revenue potential has always been overshadowed by a relatively higher 
expenditure due to the ineffective tax collection mechanisms that has seen 80 percent in the 
informal sector pay less or no tax. 
 THE TAX COLLECTION PROBLEM IN GHANA 
Despite all the interventions by international financial institutions, the country’s debt 
stock has been on the rise (refer to Figure 1.2) and at an all-time high—GHS200 billion 
(US$1=GHS5.57) as at August 2019 (Dogbevi, 2019) and GHS173 billion at the end of 2018 
(Finance Ministry, 2018); and the IMF is already warning the country could be heading towards 
another bailout, citing poor domestic revenue mobilization and off-budget spending as the main 
reasons (Kessie, 2019). Indeed, the revenue mobilization problem is obvious in Figure 1.2 





above, as revenue at all times (from 1980 to 2018) has been below total government expenditure 
and the resulting gap is filled by borrowed funds.  
As Ghana’s population expanded, pressure intensified for increased government 
expenditure. Demands from the public for social intervention programs, infrastructure, and 
welfare programs are all currently rising in Ghana, but the proportion of the Ghanaian labor force 
in the formal sector is 20 percent (Business and Financial Times, 2019).  Ghana has an extremely 
narrow tax net with the formal sector paying both direct and indirect taxes but with close to 100 
percent of the informal sector paying no direct taxes at all (Armah, 2016). According to Business 
and Financial Times (2019), the informal sector is worth GHS81 billion and grows 2.6 percent 
annually, which is more than a quarter of Ghana’s 2018 total GDP (GHS300.5 billion). The 
difficulty for government to get taxes from the large informal sector makes it almost inevitable to 
minimize the levels of state borrowing. So, it is not any surprise that the IMF predicts the 
country could be heading for another bailout if it does not step up its revenue collection 
mechanisms because the country has a relatively lower revenue base.  
Unlike some of the eurozone and Latin American countries such as Greece, Brazil, 
Argentina, and Portugal that witnessed poor growth at a time of increasing debt, Ghana grew 8.1 
percent in 2017, and 6.1 percent in 2018 despite rising debt levels, according to Bloomberg 
(2019). This leads to the question whether debt is a credible challenge to Ghana’s economic 
growth as the literature suggests in the case of the European and Latin American countries. As 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) found, debt is negatively related to growth at a debt to GDP level 
above 90 per cent. Below 90 per cent, the relationship positive. Therefore, the aim of this paper 
is to investigate if Ghana’s rising public debt is a credible challenge to its economic growth using 





time series data from 1980 to 2018. It will also examine the level of debt at which growth is 
steady or subdued in the West African nation. 
OBJECTIVES OF STUDY  
• To investigate why Ghana’s debt keep rising 
• To determine whether Ghana’s rising indebtedness is a credible threat to its growth? 
• To investigate whether growth levels influence the level of government indebtedness in Ghana or 
vice versa. 
• To provide a recommendation to policymakers on how to choose on debt-growth policies 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
• Is Ghana’s rising debt a credible challenge to its economic growth? 
• Do growth levels influence the level of government indebtedness in Ghana or vice versa. 
• What is the optimal level of debt for sustainable growth? 
 
RELEVANCE AND JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STUDY 
As indicated above, governments and policymakers need to comprehensively understand 
the pros and cons of government borrowing to make informed decisions on debt levels to 
maintain an uncompromised growth level. Multinational corporations also need to have a vivid 
idea of what high levels of public debt means, especially to the exchange rate and inflation in 
assessing potential host nations before making investment decisions. But the most important 
benefit of this study is that it seeks to identify debt thresholds and the behavior of economic 





growth at each threshold. This is what makes this topic relevant to all these stakeholders and 































CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 THEORETICAL LITERATURE 
 Following analysis of the neo-classical theory on production, Cunningham (1993) 
explained the relationship between GDP growth and the burden of public debt. He explained that 
the debt burden affects the productivity of labor and accumulation of capital. The neo-classical 
model posits that output (GDP growth) is a function of three factors: labor, capital, and 
technology. Shah and Pervin (2012) and Cunningham (1993) included the debt burden in the 
model to allow for the quantification of the effect of public debt on Economic growth. They 
found out that external debt stock has no relationship with growth, but it is rather the external 
debt servicing that is negatively related with economic growth. This could be the result of the 
disinvestment that public debt servicing comes with because external debt servicing ends up 
crowding out capital that could have been used to invest in certain areas of the economy to spur 
growth. Holding a similar view, Sachs and Williamson (1986) conclude that when indebted 
countries pay their debts or service them then real resources are transferred from private sector to 
public sector. It is important to note that it is not external debt servicing alone that is crowding 
out private capital but also internal debts too. This is established in Diamond (1965) when he 
examined the role of debt using the neoclassical theory. He concluded that internal debt results in 
a reduction in capital stock because it substitutes government debt for physical capital. In effect, 
both internal and external debts lead to the crowding out of capital. However, traditional 
neoclassical models predict that developing countries have limited capital stock levels at their 
initial stages of development and improved capital mobility (in the form of external debt) will 
spur economic growth (Chowdhury, 2001) if the borrowed funds are put into productive use 





(Burnside & Dollar, 2000). This brings into the equation the competency and incorruptibility of 
governments and policymakers with respect to the use of borrowed funds. 
 One of the widely used theories in analyzing growth is the Ricardian equivalence 
theory—proposed by David Ricardo (1817). The theory describes the role of debt in economic 
growth in the classical growth model. According to his theory, whenever government borrows, it 
must repay this borrowing by raising taxes. As a result, the high taxation will disincentivize 
investment in the economy, hence a subdued growth potential. Feldstein (1986) corroborates the 
Ricardian equivalence by positing that governments need to impose taxes on private sector to 
finance debt obligations. This leads to the “problem of debt overhang” which asserts that if there 
is a probability that a country’s future debt will be more than its repayment ability then 
anticipated costs of debt-servicing can suppress investment (Krugman, 1988). When people 
anticipate a rise in debt service in the future, they are more likely to defer spending and save 
towards a high-tax future. This results in sinking the returns on investment and leading to 
reduction in economic growth (Akram, 2015).  
 The Classical view only favors the supply side of the economy and advocates for less 
government involvement in economic activities. Highly critical and dismissive of the Classical 
debt theory was the Keynesian theory of public debt. Keynes (1982 ) argued that consistent 
imbalanced budgets and increasing public debt never subdued the financial stability of countries 
as Classical economists claimed. However, the Keynesians believed governments should be 
allowed to incur debt as much as they can to boost consumption and increase effective demand in 
the economy. The increased demand via consumption-driven borrowing should have the same 
effect on growth just as investment-driven borrowing (Keynes, 1982). The increased demand as 





a result of increased spending will encourage firms to increase production, unemployment, and 
investment to meet growing demand.  
 Putting the Classical and the Keynesian theories together, Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) 
proposed the “conventional view of public debt.” They argued output is demand-driven in the 
short run excessive public spending or debt positively influence income levels, aggregate 
demand and output levels—exactly the Keynesian argument. However, in the long run, things 
are different if the Ricardian equivalence holds not. Elmendorf and Mankiw argued that public 
savings are reduced due to budget deficits and that decease cannot be fully compensated by 
increased private savings. Consequently, the national savings will decrease, investment levels 
will fall, and growth becomes subdued. 
 EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
 Reinhart and Rogoff (2010,2011) were the first to extensively examine the relationship 
between public debt and economic growth in the twenty-first century. In Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009), they concluded that public debt has a growth-reducing effect on an economy. However, 
in Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), further discovery by the authors suggests that the relationship 
between the variables is nonlinear; it is a convex curve. Below a debt to GDP ratio threshold of 
ninety percent (90 percent), debt has a growth enhancing effects on an economy; whiles above 
the 90% threshold, debt has a growth reducing effect on an economy. 
  However, the findings of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) were criticized by Herndon et al. 
(2013) and they found that there were certain coding errors and selective exclusion of available 
data and if these issues were corrected, GDP growth at debt/GDP ratios over 90 per cent is not 
significantly different from when debt/GDP ratios are lower. The existence of GDP/debt 
thresholds above or below which there is a certain growth response has been re-echoed by other 
researchers, although with differing views on the exact level of such thresholds. For example, 





Cecchetti et al. (2011) found that once public debt moves above a debt/GDP threshold level of 
85 per cent, economic growth begins to fall whiles Blayy (2006) even finds a much lower 
threshold, 21 percent. Blavy concludes that the optimal debt/GDP is 21 per cent and that 
doubling public debt would reduce productivity growth by about 1.5 per cent. This quite 
converges at Baseerit (2005)’s submission that the earlier stage of borrowing is usually marked 
with enhanced growth resulting from modest debt levels whiles the later stage of borrowing leads 
to subdued growth. This is quite understandable because the later stage of borrowing is more 
likely to be characterized by the debt overhang which potentially crowds out investment for the 
time being in anticipation of tax increments.  
 So far, the paper has looked at general conclusions of the literature on the debt-growth 
nexus. But the variables exhibit different forms of relationship in different parts of the world. 
 For example, Amartya Sen studied the variables in Latin America and Asia in 2007 and 
concluded that due to severe debt overhang effect; economic growth in Latin American 
economies slows down. However, debt overhang does not exist in Asian countries (Sen et al., 
2007). Cohen (1993) also showed that in highly indebted developing countries, level of external 
debt does not have any role in subduing growth. Meanwhile, Panizza and Prebistero (2013) 
concludes that there is little evidence in advanced economies that public debt will depress 
economic growth. However, in the case of developing countries a significant fraction of debt is 
external, so the debt overhang argument needs greater attention there.  
 THE LITERATURE ON GHANA 
  Anning et al. (2018) examined the variables by running Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression using time series data spanning from 1990 to 2015 (26 years). They focused on 
external debt, domestic debt, investment spending, imports, inflation, government expenditure 
and national savings as their independent variables.  





In effect, they regressed economic growth on external and internal debt to find the 
relationship between the variables. They found that there is a negative relationship between debt 
(domestic and external) and growth in the economy of Ghana.  Just as the previous researchers 
discussed earlier, Anning et al. (2018) concluded that there are certain debt/GDP thresholds for 
sustainable and steady growth, but they failed to show it in their submission. As Burnside and 
Dollar (2000) proposed, Anning et al. (2018) also concluded that the benefits of debt could be 
maximized if borrowed funds are put into productive uses and corruption is minimized.    
Another study on Ghana by Owusu-Nantwi and Erickson (2016) using time series data 
from 1980 to 2012 on seven macroeconomic variables yielded an interesting result. They found 
out, without reference to a particular debt/GDP threshold, that the empirical results reveal a 
positive and significant long-run relationship between economic growth and public debt. 
However, in the short run, there is a bidirectional relationship between public debt and economic 
growth.  
Matuka and Asafo (2018) employed Johansen co-integration test and the Vector Error 
Correction Model (VECM) to analyze the relationship between the variables using time series 
data from 1970 to 2017. They concluded that external debt stimulates growth both in the long 
run and the short run in Ghana and that, external debt servicing crowds out investment capital. 
The negative debt servicing effect, as explained by the authors, is due to the commitment of 
receipts to the payment of debts instead of investing in growth enhancing sectors of the 
economy. The authors reiterated the existence of a nonlinear relationship between the variables 
but also failed to specify the debt thresholds and the associated growth patterns. 
 





CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 CHOICE AND JUSTIFICATION OF THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 
Throughout the summary of the literature, majority of studies revealed various 
relationships between public debt and economic growth and the various thresholds at which 
those relationships exist. To tackle the numerous problems that public debt comes with, 
knowledge of the relationship between the variables is not enough to make informed decisions 
debt levels.  
The debt/GDP threshold is necessary to inform policymakers on the level of debt needed 
for sustainable growth. This study aims at filling the debt/GDP threshold gap left by the literature 
on the Ghanaian economy.  
Following Matuka and Asafo (2018) and Anning et al. (2016), the study adopted an 
Ordinary Least Squares regression model with capital investment, government expenditure, 
public debt, inflation rate, and exports being a function of GDP growth. The OLS model is 
specified as follows: 
𝑔𝑑𝑃 = 𝐵𝑜 +  𝐵1𝐼𝑛𝑣 +  𝐵2 Inf + 𝐵3𝑔𝑥 + 𝐵4𝑥𝑝 +  𝐵5𝑑𝑟 + 𝜀   
Where; 
gdp……………… real GDP growth 
Inv…………………… capital investment (percent of GDP) 
Inf ……………………. inflation 
Gx………………………. government expenditure (percent of GDP) 
Xp………………………. Exports of goods and services (percent of GDP) 
dr………………………. total debt (percent of GDP) 
 captures the unobserved factors affecting economic growth 





The variables included in the model were informed by Robert Barro (1996’s) study on a 
panel of 100 countries from 1960 to 1990 to examine factors that influenced growth. Growth rate 
of real per capita GDP was found to be positively related with maintenance of the rule of law, 
lower government spending, higher life expectancy, higher investment levels, advanced level of 
democracy, low inflation rate, and trade openness. 
Kavoussi (1994) also concluded, albeit not surprising, that increased growth levels are 
highly and significantly related with increased levels of export.  
Due to missing data on life expectancy, democracy, rule of law, and informed by the OLS 
model deployed by Anning et al. (2016) and Matuka and Asafo (2018), the study limited the 
independent variables to debt-GDP ratio, exports, government expenditure, inflation, and capital 
investment. Due to serial correlation, trade openness and imports were dropped from the model. 
 FREQUENCY, RANGE AND SOURCES OF DATA 
The GDP growth rate (annual) and annual inflation rate from 1970 to 2018 for Ghana 
were retrieved from the World bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) whiles total debt 
(percent of GDP), exports of goods and services (percent of GDP), capital investment (percent of 
GDP) and government expenditure (percent of GDP) for the same period were retrieved from the 
IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO). Missing data for an indicator in a particular year(s) 
from one of these two sources will be filled using data from the other source since these are 
credible and guarantees the reliability of the data. 
 DESCRIPTION OF DATA PREPARATION, COLLATION AND ANALYSIS 
PROCEDURES 
As used by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), debt-to-GDP ratio at different levels will be used 
to examine how growth reacts to those debt thresholds in the Ghanaian economy. The study will 
look at four debt-GDP thresholds as in Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) as follows: years when 





debt/GDP ratio was below 25 percent, years when debt/GDP ratio was between 25 and 45 
percent, years when the ratio was between 45 and 60 per cent, and years when it was above the 
60 percent threshold.  
Data will be subjected to the Breusch-Pagan test of heteroscedasticity to ensure the data 
meets the unconditional variance assumption for a Multiple Linear Regression model. If data is 
heteroskedastic, the Robust Least Squares regression approach would be adopted to neutralize 
the effect of skewness on the values of the coefficients.  






















CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 Empirical Method and Results 
 
Following the multiple regression module specified above, regressing the GDP growth 
(gdp) on the regressors using the least squares method returned spurious results as in Table 
1.0 for obvious reasons. The zero-conditional variance assumption of homoskedasticity has 
been violated by the data and this is confirmed by the significance of the F-statistic of the 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test for heteroskedasticity in Table 1.8.  
However, to ensure the robustness of the data so that outliers and little variations in 
the data do not affect the outcome of the parameters (coefficients), this study opted for the 
Robust Least Squares MM-Regression which controls for outliers or little variations in 
both the regressors and the regressand. Once again, the paper seeks to investigate the 
association between Ghana’s public debt and economic growth. So, the robust least 
squares regression seeks to quantify the effect of debt (dr) on GDP growth (gdp).  
From Table 1.6, the coefficient of the debt (dr) is not significant and a subsequent 
Wald’s test restricting the debt co-efficient to zero turned highly insignificant as evidenced 
by the insignificance of the Wald Test’s t-statistic and F-statistic in Table 1.9, thereby 
failing to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the debt rate is zero.  
As Reinhart and Rogoff (2012, 2013) discovered, there could be a nonlinear 
relationship between the variables, thereby making the use of linear regression models 
inappropriate in capturing the partial effect of the debt rate on growth.  
To test for non-linear relationship between public debt and economic growth, the 
study opted for a discrete threshold regression with up to four intervals. The results (in 





Table 1.5) showed that indeed the relationship between debt and growth is nonlinear and 
exhibit a normal u-shaped curve, surprisingly opposite of Reinhart and Rogoff (2012’s) 
conclusion of a u-shaped relationship. It is worth noting that the sample size of the data is 
important in establishing a relationship. Reinhart and Rogoff used data for over 200 
countries in their study.  
The threshold regression results indicate that when debt is less than 25 percent of 
GDP, a 10 percent increase in debt leads to 13.15% reduction in economic growth. 
However, when debt is between 25 percent and 45 percent of GDP, there appears no 
relationship between the variables. The no-relationship is judged from the insignificance of 
the t-statistic at 95% confidence level for that debt range. The study further subjected the 
coefficient of the growth between 25 and 45 percent debt-GDP ratio to the Wald Test to 
confirm if indeed there is no relationship at that range of debt between the variables. The 
Wald test statistics (in Table 1.7) all proved insignificant, leading to a failure to reject the 
null hypothesis that the growth at debt levels between 25 and 45 percent of GDP is zero. 
So, we conclude that there is no relationship between growth and debt at debt levels 
between 25 and 45 percent of GDP. 
The third debt threshold is between 45 percent and 60 percent of GDP where growth is 
positive and highly significant. Also, when debt surpasses 60 percent of GDP, economic 
growth seems to be responding positively stronger.  
4.1.1 The Granger Causality Test of the module. 
The Granger test for causality is a hypothesis test used to establish whether a particular 
time series data is useful in predicting the values of another variable. In this study, we test 
whether economic growth granger-causes the level of public debt, public debt granger-
causes growth, or there exists a bidirectional relationship between the variables.  





The Granger test results for one lag of the data in Figure 1.1 shows that public debt 
significantly granger-causes growth, whiles growth is insignificant in predicting debt.  
Further testing of the data at two, three, and four lags indicates that debt levels significantly 
influence growth in the long run up to three years (refer to Table 1.2 and 1.3). The fourth lag 




























CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
This study examined the relationship between Ghana’s public debt and economic 
growth using time series data from 1970 to 2018. The study employed Robust Least 
Squares regression, Discrete threshold regression, and the Granger Test of causality to 
investigate the relationship between the variables in a linear regression model.  
The Granger test results for one lag of the data in Table 1.1 shows that public debt 
significantly granger-causes growth, whiles growth is insignificant in predicting debt.  
Further testing of the data at two, three, and four lags indicates that debt levels 
significantly influence growth in the long run up to three years (refer to Table 1.2, 1.3, 
1.4).  
In short, public debt causes economic growth, but economic growth does not cause 
debt. This is understandable because there is evidence of increased borrowing in times of 
higher economic growth in Ghana. A good example is the remarkable performance of 
Ghana’s growth in the last three years (2017 - 2019) and the corresponding remarkable 
increase in borrowing by the government in that period (World bank, 2019; Bloomberg, 
2020). Part of the justification for this could be the large informal sector suffocating the 
government of tax revenue even in times of growth. Growth includes the informal sector, 
but government revenue does not necessarily increase with growth in an economy where 
the informal sector dominates, hence government’s continuous demand for borrowing even 
in times of remarkable growth.  
 A look at the Robust Least Squares regression shows that public debt is insignificant 
in explaining economic growth. Attention must be paid to the fact that Least Squares 
regressors are linear in the parameters and hence will not be useful in estimating 





coefficients with non-linear relationships. This prompted the use of discrete threshold 
regression analysis to estimate the relationship at different debt thresholds.  
From the threshold regression analysis, at debt-to-GDP ratio below 25 percent, growth 
is negative (-1.348). Growth is insignificant at debt threshold between 25 percent and 45 
percent. However, when debt is above 45 percent of GDP, growth is significantly positive. 
Between 45 and 60 percent of GDP, growth is 3.21 percent, whiles when debt supersedes 
60 percent of GDP growth is significantly around 6 percent.  
Considering the nature of the thresholds exhibited by the data, the data assumes a 
normal u-shape pattern—it exhibits a negative relationship at debt levels below 25 percent 
of GDP, attains a minimum point at debts levels between 25 and 45 percent of GDP, and 
then begins to rise thereafter. So, the Ghanaian case is the opposite of inverted u-shape 
propositions by researchers such as Reinhart and Rogoff (2010, 2011). 
 The nature of the non-linear relationship could be attributed to the revenue 
expenditure gap discussed in chapter 2 of this study. Given that the government strives to 
meet the rising needs of Ghanaians using inadequate internally generated funds, it must 
resort to borrowing to meet the needs of the Ghanaian people and to invest in the economy 
to spur growth. This means that low levels of debt could be insufficient in meeting the 
demands of Ghanaians while at same time investing in key sectors of the economy to spur 
growth, hence the negative relationship at lower levels of debt (below 25 percent). But 
higher debt levels mean more funds to meet the needs of Ghanaians and invest to spur 
growth, hence the positive relationship at higher debt levels (above 45 percent).  
 Developing countries lack investment capital at their initial stages of growth 
(Chowdhury, 2001), and Ghana is not an exception. To inject enough investment capital 





into the economy to spur growth, the study recommends that government keeps its debt 
level well above 45 percent of GDP. But as Burnside and Dollar (2006) suggest, borrowing 
is only prudent with minimal corruption levels and identifying and investing the borrowed 
funds in the growth enhancing sectors of the economy to spur growth. The huge informal 
sector also cripples governments efforts to raise tax revenue for investment spending. So, 
the study recommends that government initiate policies to formalize, at least, parts of the 
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Table 1.0: OLS regression Estimates 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. 
Error 
t-Statistic Prob.   
INF -0.048034 0.026780 
-
1.793604 0.0799 
INV -0.026679 0.131146 -0.20343 0.8398 
XP 0.113592 0.092628 1.226322 0.2268 
GX 0.057580 0.314801 0.182909 0.8557 
DR -0.001094 0.048780 -0.02243 0.9822 
C 2.473721 4.028376 0.614074 0.5424 
R-squared 0.227248      
Adjusted 
R-squared 
0.137393     
F-statistic 2.529050      
    Prob (F-
statistic) 
0.043009  
Source: World Bank’s WDIs (2020) 
 
Table 1.1: Pairwise Granger Causality Test (1 lag) 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
GDP does not Granger Cause DEBT 48 0.15323 0.6973 
DEBT does not Granger Cause GDP  4.09816 0.0489 
Source: World Bank’s WDIs (2020), IMF’s WEOs (2020) 
 
Table 1.2: Pairwise Granger Causality Tests (2 lags) 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
GDP does not Granger Cause DEBT 47 0.40940 0.6667 





DEBT does not Granger Cause GDP  4.54341 0.0164 
Source: World Bank’s WDIs (2020), IMF’s WEOs (2020) 
 
Table 1.3: Pairwise Granger Causality Tests (3 lags) 
 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
GDP does not Granger Cause DEBT 46 0.73668 0.5365 
DEBT does not Granger Cause GDP  2.96916 0.0435 
Source: World Bank’s WDIs (2020), IMF’s WEOs (2020) 
 
Table 1.4: Pairwise Granger Causality Tests (4 lags) 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
GDP does not Granger Cause DEBT 45 0.47809 0.7515 
DEBT does not Granger Cause GDP  1.90079 0.1315 



















Table 1.5: Discrete Threshold Regression Output  
 
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error    t-Statistic Prob. 
 DR < 25.22294 -- 7 obs  
GDP -1.314617 0.566673 -2.319887 0.0254 
 25.22294 <= DR < 44.49114 -- 23 obs  
GDP -0.177239 0.282173 -0.628122 0.5334 
 44.49114 <= DR < 57.869999 -- 12 obs  
GDP 3.214704 0.523526 6.140481 0.0000 
 57.869999 <= DR -- 7 obs   
GDP 5.984984 0.720861 8.302555 0.0000 
 Non-Threshold Variables   
GX 1.132205 0.332472 3.405414 0.0015 
XP 0.244415 0.169524 1.441774 0.0070 
INF 0.175363 0.042451 4.130986 0.0002 
INV 0.637302 0.244611 2.605365 0.0127 
R-
squared 0.781549    Mean dependent var 40.74551 
Source: World Bank’s WDIs (2020), IMF’s WEOs (2020) 
 
Table 1.6: Robust Least Squares Regression output 
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error  z-Statistic   Prob.                       R-squared  
INF           -0.060565 0.017241 -3.512787    0.0004                    0.496970 
INV                     -0.179410 0.088504 -2.027148   0.0426 
XP                        0.140325 0.062302 2.252352   0.0243 
GX                       0.57641     0.125330 4.59918      0.0000 
DR                      -0.007304   0.030083      -0.242809   0.8082 
Source: World Bank’s WDIs (2020), IMF’s WEOs (2020) 








Table 1.7: Wald Test of Coefficient Restriction 
 
Test Statistic Value df Probability 
 t-statistic -0.628122  41  0.5334 
 F-statistic  0.394537 (1, 41)  0.5334 
 Chi-square  0.394537  1  0.5299 
Null Hypothesis: C(2)=0  
Null Hypothesis Summary: 
  
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
C(2)           -0.177239 
Restrictions are linear in coefficients. 
 0.282173 
Source: World Bank’s WDIs (2020), IMF’s WEOs (2020) 
 
Table 1.8: Output for Breuch-Pagan-Godfrey Test for heteroskedasticity  
  
Null hypothesis: Homoskedasticity 
 
 F-statistic 1.235249    Prob. F (5,43) 0.0094 
Obs*R-squared 6.154111    Prob. Chi-Square (5) 0.02915 
Scaled explained SS 14.99431    Prob. Chi-Square (5) 0.0104 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-
Statistic 
Prob.   
C 21.45362 37.53761 0.571523 0.5706 
XP 0.020659 0.863139 0.023935 0.9810 
GX 3.423303 2.933413 1.167003 0.2496 
INF -0.121854 0.249549 -0.488299 0.6278 





INV -1.774395 1.222057 -1.451974 0.1538 
DR -0.242543 0.454544 -0.533597 0.5964 
               F-statistic 11.235249      
         Prob (F- statistic) 0.009396  
Source: World Bank’s WDIs (2020), IMF’s WEOs (2020) 
 
Table 1.9: Wald Test of Coefficient Restriction  
 Test Statistic Value df Probability 
 t-statistic -0.628122  41  0.5334 
 F-statistic  0.394537 (1, 41)  0.5334 
 Chi-square  0.394537  1  0.5299 
Null Hypothesis: C(2) = 0   
Summary: 
  
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
 C(2) -0.177239 
Restrictions are linear in coefficients. 
 0.282173 
Source: World Bank’s WDIs (2020), IMF’s WEOs (2020) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
